NIST ran red-team tests on AI agents recently. novel, agent-specific attacks, ones targeting how agents interpret instructions and tool calls rather than classic jailbreaks, succeeded in about 81% of attempts. the strongest known baseline attacks only succeeded in ~11%. that’s roughly 7x more effective, and it’s a completely different attack surface than what any current framework actually tests for. (numbers from hacken’s q2 2026 report if anyone wants the source) the regulatory frameworks that exist right now (EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001) are all built around governance, risk classification, disclosure, documentation. none of them require testing whether an agent can actually be tricked into executing an unauthorized action. ISO does have a guidance doc specifically for this (ISO/IEC 27090), but it’s written in “should” language rather than “shall,” so there’s no certification path and nothing binding attached to it. which means an organization can hold a full AI governance certificate while the actual question, can someone hijack this agent’s instructions, remains completely untested by anything on paper. this creates a weird backdrop given what’s happening on both sides right now. the EU just deferred its high-risk AI Act obligations to 2027-28, essentially admitting it’s not ready to enforce them yet. the US is doing the opposite, rolling back state-level AI rules through litigation and executive orders because it doesn’t think this level of oversight should exist in the first place. both sides are arguing about how much governance there should be, and neither is building the actual security testing layer underneath it. so right now it sounds like nobody has actually solved this, the standards don’t require it and nobody’s forcing anyone to test for it. submitted by /u/Hacken_io
Originally posted by u/Hacken_io on r/ArtificialInteligence